Jennifer Todd is a distinguished academic. She is a former professor in UCD’s School of Politics and International Relations; former director of UCD’s Institute for British-Irish Studies, and currently a fellow at that university’s Geary Institute for Public Policy. She has been researching ethnicity, identity, conflict and Northern Ireland for more than 30 years.

19 years ago my first blog when I was director of the Centre for Cross Border Studies was based on a study of inter-generational attitudes in the border area by a team of political scientists and psychologists from UCD and Queen’s University Belfast led by Professor Todd.¹ This concluded that British and Irish government and EU policy “to encourage cross-community and cross-border contact, is on exactly the right lines, and should be extended. This is the way in which lasting change can be provoked in enough individuals to percolate through entire communities.” They warned, however, that this would be a long-drawn out business and “it would be counter-productive to demand immediate and measurable political results from cross-community and cross-border initiatives.”

In a paper last year called ‘Irish policy making and planning for a possible future united Ireland’, Todd once again urged caution, even if it was based on cautious optimism.² “Policy planning for a future united Ireland is foundational, difficult and dangerous, “she said. “At basis, it involves the Irish government providing a model of a united Ireland to be put to all the people of the island in concurrent referendums in each jurisdiction. If planners get it wrong – if for example there is a ‘yes’ vote for a model of united Ireland that no one really wants and which generates widespread disillusion – the consequences will be felt for decades.”

It is even more dangerous because of “global public disengagement from conventional forms of democracy, from expertise and from ‘change leaders”, she warned. Ordinary people’s views had to be taken into account, and most people in both jurisdictions wanted clarity on the type of united Ireland on offer before they vote. “Modelling a future united Ireland is a foundational task that potentially touches on all aspects of life, and that has deep, often unspoken, emotional resonances which differ in each jurisdiction.”

“The Irish government has the central role in putting forward a model of a united Ireland in a future referendum in each jurisdiction.” This is a particularly unusual kind of task. “Irish policy makers will have to outline the form of a new state (a future united Ireland), whose remit will cover the whole island and which must be acceptable not just to the citizens in the Irish state but also to those in Northern Ireland. They must have this model available at a time chosen by another state – the initiation of a referendum in Northern Ireland is the defined task of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – but the same question and model must be available for the referendum in Northern Ireland and the concurrent referendum in the Republic of Ireland.”

She said there is a “strong argument that a ‘process’ model is preferable whereby many decisions are made in a transition period after a positive vote for unity in each jurisdiction”. However she warned that the task for the Irish state – and its politicians and civil servants – is particularly difficult for at least four reasons:

First, the Irish government has responsibility without power. The Irish state is the only body that can credibly and legally design a model to go forward in a unity referendum and it will have to implement the voters’ decision. But some of the key decision-making citizens are in another jurisdiction, Northern Ireland.

Second, the issue is “exceptionally and existentially difficult. It touches on identity and loyalty as well as interest. It speaks to foundational assumptions about the political and social world. And it does so for different populations who have radically opposed perspectives and different paradigms of understanding of politics and society. Moreover, these differing perspectives were at the centre of group conflict in Northern Ireland. To open these opposing paradigms to discussion is necessary, because they frame judgements and even emotions. But this also threatens to retrigger group solidarity and conflict.”

Third, “the language of constitutional debate has provoked widespread disengagement, and silence, rather than reflection.” “Opinion polls and research have shown that around half of the population on the island wants to distance from traditional nationalist/unionist debates.”

“The issues are not only emotive, but those emotions have been silenced and thus not dealt with. Some try to avoid thinking about a possible future united Ireland because the issue seems to ensnare them in perspectives they do not much like but are unable to find a way out of. Their views are thus likely to swing widely, seemingly unpredictably.”  

She cited a recent focus group overseen by herself and fellow researchers, Joanne McEvoy of Aberdeen University and John Doyle of Dublin City University, made up of people who did not know how they might vote in a future unity referendum, to illustrate this volatility. Despite their uncertainty, “once issues about a future possible united Ireland were raised, they responded intuitively, emotionally and forcefully – when asked about changing the flag and anthem, they answered ‘No, no, no, no’. When asked about joining the Commonwealth, they said it was like ‘spitting on your ancestors’ graves for everything that they fought for’. Once they heard their own conversation, they pulled back: at the end of the 90 minute focus group, participants were saying ‘sure that’s never going to work’, ‘We have to be more open minded, ready for some change as well’… It was clear that they held contradictory views, and swung between them. Was this simply because they didn’t have a defined constitutional preference?”

Fourth, “this is a situation where people do not have accurate information about conditions in the other jurisdiction”. For example, “the cost of unity to the Irish state depends on negotiations with the UK, which have not yet happened. In this situation, misinformation and partial information is likely to be weaponised.”

However she cited one positive factor. “Although the planning task is very difficult, it is not yet immediate. Unlike the German government in 1989, the Irish government has a number of years – one might guess a decade – to accomplish it before a referendum happens.”

People’s preferences today are clearly deeply divided: Unionists differ from nationalists, Southern nationalists from Northern nationalists. “Learning from this, analysts attempt to find the highest common factor in the radically opposed views, the options that would be least bad, and that would maximise losers’ consent in a future referendum. Thus, for example, it has been argued that a devolved Northern Ireland under Irish sovereignty is the best option because it is least disturbing to Northern unionists. It also would have the benefit of minimally disturbing institutions and practices in the Republic. But there is a potential problem: this is a model of a united Ireland that no one really wants, one that is uninspiring as well as costly. It is very likely to lead to later disillusion.” 

“Are there ways to anticipate where people’s views might move in the future?” asked Todd. She came down in favour of ‘deliberation’ [the Republic’s Citizens’ Assemblies are examples of deliberative structures, where a random sample of citizens, alongside politicians, discuss and make recommendations on controversial issues]. However it should be deliberation that aims “to find points of commonality and convergence”, rather than “to arrive at an informed choice between pre-given options.”

“Moreover the deliberative net has to be cast very widely, going beyond representative sampling to look at many diverse clusters of the population whose perspectives, unease, and potential for change may be distinctive, prioritising access rather than representativeness, and inclusion of different perspectives, not just different social categories. And, since we do not yet know the issues at stake for participants, the deliberative method has to allow them – to the maximum degree possible – to set their own agenda of discussion, define their own priorities, and interrogate one another.”

Todd then outlined the findings of her team’s 2020-2024 research, based on interviews and focus groups with about 100 people, North and South, accessed through community associations. These were mainly women, migrants and young people because previous research had shown that they are the groups most disengaged from discussion on the constitutional question. In 2022 the researchers had held four in-person ‘deliberative cafes’ – small informal local deliberations of about three hours – with over 60 participants. Their participants were defined ‘transversally’, i.e. not as unionists or nationalists, but for example, as border women or gender activists. “They were very diverse, from all parts of the island, all religions and none, and with diverse political perspectives. Our method was to raise the broad issue of constitutional change and North-South relations and ask for their perceptions and priorities around the issues, so as to encourage their participation in defining the issues in debate.”

Their findings surprised them. First, they found “very substantive convergence” amongst the diverse participants on issues of process and values. Participants agreed that there should be conversations – not debates – about the issues, but starting from people’s organic experience, not from ideology. They agreed that as many people as possible should be involved. “They agreed that bread-and-butter socio-economic and rights’ issues were priorities, much more than the precise issues of institutional design. They agreed, for the most part, that time should be taken to get the picture right. Participation of these transversally defined groups increased convergence, and provided confidence that participatory discussion, properly organised, could be constructive.”

Women, in particular, argued for conversation rather than debate.They saw this as beginning with ‘pre-conversations’ which helped understand other perspectives and develop shared values, even if they have different preferences. Participants saw this as something that could take place locally – in local ‘knit and natter’ groups – networked together.

“Second, they were surprised that amongst the obstacles to participation, the constitutional discourse itself was most emphasised.” It was seen as ideological, rather than based on experience, “as provoking knee-jerk responses rather than engaging in thought, and as non-organic. The very terms ‘constitutional change’ and ‘Irish unity’ were criticised. This was a very immediate intuitive response by many – one gender activist said she felt that she had ‘rocked up to the wrong meeting’. On the other hand, the vast majority of our participants were concerned about the shape of a future society, interested in how others saw it and wanted to continue the discussion, but on terms that spoke to real experience.”

“Third, our participants emphasised issues of practical life – bread-and-butter issues and rights, not primarily identity and institutions. It wasn’t just the financial cost of unity, but the form of life that would result, and the changes to their lives, and those of their families. They wanted improvement – not just the end of barriers of religion in Northern Ireland, but the end of barriers of class in Dublin. In this sense, they wanted constitutional change that would be inspiring.”

This sharing of experience led to “clear and credible collective definitions of the shared problems – a step change from individual experience to convergent collective definition. This provides one criterion for judgement on policy initiatives and constitutional change. To put it crudely, any model of a united Ireland that did not alleviate present problems of cross-border healthcare would not be good enough.”

Todd and her long-time research partner, Professor Joanne McEvoy, would like to scale up these deliberations to include sessions with politicians and policy makers about how to remedy the problems raised by the people in the ‘deliberative cafes’ (“This builds accountability – the absence of which so frustrated our participants in earlier research – into the process.”) And a subsequent ‘constitutional’ session “where deliberation is structured around the construction of a constitutional model (either united Ireland or United Kingdom) that would help alleviate the problems.”

I know ARINS – the collaboration between the University of Notre Dame and the Royal Irish Academy – is already doing some of this kind of work, albeit with little unionist participation. However I would like to see the Irish universities, north and south, being more involved. A possible vehicle for this would be Universities Ireland – the network of 10 university presidents on the island – which is administered by the Centre for Cross Border Cooperation (formerly the Centre for Cross Border Studies). This is a body looking for a role. Funding and overseeing the kind of deeply serious research leading to clear policy recommendations on a possible ‘new Ireland’ that Professor Todd is leading would be an obvious candidate.

¹ ‘Ignore the Cynics: Cooperation Works!’ A Note from the Next Door Neighbours, 6 September 2006

² publicpolicy.ie/governance/irish-policy-making-and-planning-for-a-possible-future-united-ireland