Much of my summer reading this year has been 20th century Irish history, and the work of superb historians like Alvin Jackson, Paul Bew, Diarmaid Ferriter, Oliver MacDonagh and others. One thing that has struck me forcibly is how many mistakes were made by successive Irish governments during the fifty years after independence when dealing with the single largest and enduring block to Irish unity: the fierce opposition of Northern unionists.[A separate, even longer article could be written about the abandonment of Northern nationalists by the Free State and successive governments].
It started early. Alvin Jackson writes that “perhaps the supreme paradox of the reunification strategy was that Dublin sought an end of partition through consolidating the structures and attitudes that maintained it. When – as in early 1922 – the Belfast government was politically vulnerable and open to moderate concession on the constitutional question, the Dublin ministry, sensing blood, ruthlessly applied the principal of northern subordination to any cross-border deal. When, in early 1923, the Northern government was economically vulnerable, the Dublin ministry sought to reinforce the economic divide between the two territories. Reunification was admittedly never likely in the early twenties, but there were certainly junctures when perhaps critical cross-border institutions might have been put in place. These passed unattended, partly because of the Free State government’s untenable claims to absolute supremacy over its northern counterpart.”1
The most striking example of this was the Free State government’s refusal to have anything to do with a Council of Ireland, proposed in Westminster’s 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Edward Carson told the House of Commons in November of that year: “I am optimistic enough to believe that it is in this Council…that there is the germ of a united Ireland in future.” The Northern finance minister, H.M.Pollock, when asked in the following year about the “ultimate unity of the country”, replied: “Through the Council of Ireland – Yes. North and South would be brought into constant contact, and the possibilities of ultimate union are, on the whole, great.”2 That British proposal remained stillborn for the following 53 years, until it was resurrected as part of the abortive Sunningdale Agreement in 1974.
Ernest Blythe, a rare republican from a Northern Protestant background and a minister in the first Cumman na nGaedheal government, said there was no need for a full-time, permanent post in the Free State government for North-South cooperation. One consequence of this extraordinary short-sightedness was that there was no senior Dublin official responsible for and/or knowledgeable about Northern Ireland affairs for nearly 50 years, leading to ignorance, confusion and panic in the Irish cabinet when the ‘Troubles’ broke out there in the summer of 1969.
Oliver MacDonagh’s view was that “Britain’s ultimate objectives in the 1921 [Anglo-Irish] negotiations were to keep Ireland within the empire, and to maintain the system of imperial defence intact. The fate of the Ulster Protestants was a secondary concern…Thus in return for an oath of allegiance to the Crown, no larger measure of independence than dominionhood for the Irish Free State, and three naval bases, the British government was prepared to coerce Northern Ireland into either some form of union with the remainder of the island or the cession of (in all likelihood) something between 30 and 45% of its total territory” [through the ill-fated Boundary Commission]. MacDonagh concluded that any far-sighted British statesman should have seen that this would be preferable to storing up future trouble by keeping the six counties of Northern Ireland intact.3
During the debates on the Anglo-Irish Treaty in January 1922, it seems extraordinarily revealing of the already partitionist mindset of most TDs that less than 3% of speaking time was devoted to the North. Things had not improved by 1935, when Taoiseach Eamon de Valera admitted in the Dail in relation to ending partition, “we have no plan…by which we can inevitably bring about the union of this country.”4 Four years later, in a speech to the Seanad, he said he would not sacrifice 26 county sovereignty or the policy of gaelicisation for the possibility of unity.
In June 1940, with the German threat to Britain at its height, an emissary from British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, Malcolm McDonald, came to Dublin with an offer to De Valera. If the Free State joined the Allies and set up an All-Ireland Defence Council, Britain would immediately declare its acceptance of the principle of a united Ireland and create a North-South body to work out the practical details of such unity. De Valera and his cabinet rejected the proposal, sceptical about the British government’s ability to deliver the Unionists.
Northern premier James Craig may have angrily rejected such a proposal. But Henry Patterson writes that Basil Brooke, a future prime minister, had told his son that faced with the choice between the destruction of ‘western civilisation’ by the Nazis and Irish unification, he would have had to accept the latter. However De Valera’s preference for maintaining the neutrality of the 26-county state (a popular position in the country) and the unity of Fianna Fail, which would have split over any jettisoning of that neutrality, saw the end of “a historic opportunity to undermine partition.”5
Then in April 1949 came the South’s witless departure from the Commonwealth, nine months before India declared itself a republic and stayed in the Commonwealth. Predictably, this was followed by legislation in the Westminster parliament to consolidate Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom.
The implications of leaving the Commonwealth for further alienating the unionists didn’t seem to have occurred to Fine Gael Taoiseach John A.Costello or his external affairs minister Sean MacBride. British prime minister Clement Attlee concluded that “the government of Eire considered the cutting of the last links which united Eire to the British Commonwealth was a more important objective of policy than ending partition.”6 The ultimate irony was that 1949 also marked the launch of the Irish government’s hopeless international anti-partition campaign.
In 1959 the new Taoiseach, Sean Lemass – who would overturn the old nationalist taboos by seeking friendly relations with the Northern unionist government – told the British ambassador that “a great number of mistakes have been made here in relation to Northern Ireland.” In 1967 the Committee on the Constitution recommended the replacement of Article 3 of the Irish Constitution with the more conciliatory wording: “The Irish nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen.” (Women were not considered!) This was not well received by the ruling Fianna Fail party and no action was taken on it. 31 years and three and a half thousand deaths in the North later, an almost identical wording was voted into the Constitution by the Irish electorate, following the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.
Are we done with Irish governments making grave errors in their Northern policies? I fear not. I fear that some Sinn Fein-led government in the near future will pile pressure on the British government to hold a premature, ill-prepared Border poll on unity. And people in the South need to actually want unity with the difficult Northerners, something I have doubts about after more than 50 years of conversations with Southern friends and colleagues. I believe that not much has changed since Frank McDermot, a rare independent TD who argued in the 1930s for persuading rather than coercing the unionists, said “the question of curing the evil of partition is our own job and nobody else’s job. If we are to undertake it, the first essential is that we should be in earnest about it, that we shall really want the reunion of Ireland on a voluntary basis.”7
1 Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998: War, Peace and Beyond, p.277
2 Paul Bew, Ireland: the Politics of Enmity 1789-2006, p.
3 Oliver MacDonagh, States of Mind: Two Centuries of Anglo-Irish Conflict, 1780-1980, p.136
4 Diarmaid Ferriter, ‘De Valera’s Long Shadow’, Irish Times Weekend, 23 August
5 Henry Patterson, Ireland since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict, p.58
6 Diarmaid Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000, p.455
7 Clare O’Halloran, Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism, p.165